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Today most companies are closely knit together with and thus dependent on suppliers, 
allies, customers, and public authorities. Member companies in such an extended 
enterprise or “business network” are either forced or volunteer to meet certain security 
objectives as a whole. As a consequence, the business network needs to agree on a 
common strategy, joint processes and technical interfaces to meet regulatory or 
voluntary requirements from industry standards. Reality shows that – even if standards 
exist – they are not harmonized and access and reconciliation between partners is 
sometimes legally, if not technically impossible, or simply too expensive. The serious and 
economic assessment of risks, already tough on the internal scale, becomes almost an 
insurmountable obstacle when considering the entire business network. This paper’s 
objective is to emphasize the importance of security in business networks for research 
and practice. Since there is little research available, it raises major questions to be 
answered by a future research agenda. A basic research framework is derived based on 
related research, an observation of the interdependencies of firms and a series of cases 
from different industry sectors. Finally, the paper discusses which factors and incentives 
might be catalysts for the adoption of such a framework by a single firm, business 
network, or even public welfare. 
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The increasing reliance of the world economy on the information infrastructure has raised questions regarding security and 
robustness at all levels of the economy, ranging from small firms who are dependent on the internet for select business 
communication to large multinationals that are extensively networked with their customers and suppliers (Johnson 2005). 
Today most companies are closely knit together with and thus dependent on suppliers, allies, customers, and public 
authorities. Henceforth, we define this the “extended enterprise” or “business network”. 
One example is MasterCard, who had problems when a data processing partner had a security leak and exposed millions of 
credit card records. Another example is the bulk electricity system, a critical infrastructure. The 2003 blackout in North 
America has demonstrated how local security incidents can spread across a business network. A failure in one operator’s 
system resulted in a communication failure to connected network control centers and thereby a spread of the failure across 
multiple operators' systems. 
This paper takes a first step towards developing a research agenda to advance efforts in this very important area. The 
objective is to emphasize the importance of security in business networks for research and practice. Since there is little 
research available, it wishes to raise major questions to be answered by a future research agenda. A basic research framework 
is presented in section 5 based on related research (section 2), an observation of the interdependencies of firms (section 3), 
and a series of cases from different industry sectors (section 4). 
Related research 
Although companies begin to assess and to mitigate the risk associated with information technology (IT) within their 
boundaries, little has been done in research or practice to analyze the risk emergent from the complex interdependencies in an 
extended enterprise or critical infrastructure. Related research that forms a ground to start from comes from three different 
domains: business networking, risk management and information security management. 
Business networking 
Business networking (Österle et al. 2000) describes the interorganizational co-operation between companies. Considering 
current trends such as greater organizational distribution of companies, increasing outsourcing, and the consistent integration 
of customers and suppliers, business networking is becoming a central object in restructuring organizations (Fleisch and 
Wintersteiger 1999). 
Business Networking extends the three-level business engineering model (Baumöl et al. 2005) to cover inter-organizational 
relationships. At the strategy level, business entities represent the nodes of the business network. Business entities are profit-
responsible and market-directed; examples include corporate groups, business units, SMEs and profit centers. A business 
entity encompasses a business strategy (definition of objectives), a number of business processes (e.g. processes of the supply 
chain) which translate the strategy into practice, resources (such as its workforce, information, capital) and relationships to 
other internal and/or external business entities. The edges indicate the co-operation relationships (typically blanket 
agreements or mutual participations) between business entities. Process networks implement the business network. Co-
ordination relationships (edges) synchronize the business processes (nodes) of different business entities. The issues arising at 
each individual level of business networking cannot be addressed independently of each other. 
As organizations increasingly rely on the internet to enable supply chain and value chain processes, the failure of any firm’s 
information network has an impact on the extended enterprise of suppliers, collaborators, and channel partners (Davis and 
Spekman 2003). Critical supply chain processes such as order fulfillment, manufacturing flow, and procurement (Lambert 
2006) depend on vast transactional data; understanding the implications and vulnerability of this flow of information within 
and across the extended enterprise is a significant and under-researched topic. Like the interdependent risks faced by other 
business partnerships (Kunreuther 2002; Kunreuther and Heal 2003), we hypothesize that information flow risks across 
trading partners exhibit many important risk management challenges; disruptions in this flow of information has the potential 
to severely disrupt economic activity at national and trans-national scales.  
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Risk identification and management 
All firms manage information security risk either explicitly or implicitly. An analytical approach (e.g. Gordon and Loeb 
2002) identifies a minimum level of information security investment that is required simply to do business – to be credible 
with potential customers and suppliers. 
 The optimal level of cybersecurity investment is achieved when the 
marginal costs of increased information security equal the marginal 
decrease in the costs due to events such as virus attacks, hacking, 
break-ins, etc, as is shown in Figure 1.  
Practically, in order for organizations to use such a method, they 
need to accurately know the costs incurred due to a lack of 
information security, their spending on information security, and 
have a good idea of what the marginal rate of return would be for a 
change in the spending. In reality, estimating many of these 
variables is difficult such as less tangible costs including the present 
and future costs of intellectual property losses or loss of future 
business due to brand damage.  
An empirical approach (e.g. Dynes 2006a; Dynes 2006b; Dynes et 
al. 2005; Kumar and Tidas 2006) identifies not only risk within the 
firm, but also the risk to a business entity due to the 
interdependencies of technically mediated business processes. This 
approach explicitly recognizes that the ability of business sectors 
and critical infrastructures to provide products and services is 
dependent on the availability of the information infrastructure. An 
example would be RiskMAP, a process that explicitly maps IT risk 
to business risk (Watters 2007).  
Information security management 
A substantial amount of research effort already has been put into concepts for the management of information security as well 
as the underlying technology (Siponen 2005). Today there is an abundance of standards and guidelines for information 
security management and an organization has to choose which to comply with (Fumy 2004). Fortunately, if one looks closer 
at the standards and recommendations, it becomes clear that there are quite a number of common elements, which are 
conceptually equivalent even though different terminology and grouping of elements is used in different documents. The 
most prominent standard, ISO 17799, defines the 12 main categories. These are shown in Table 1. 
Organizations trying to implement information security management in compliance with such standard requirements face 
various challenges. Among them there are the following: 
• Quantifying risks is a complex task and the effort of doing so thoroughly is often hard to justify to management. Similar 
challenges arise when resources for information security operations need to be justified.  
• Maintaining an accurate inventory of assets requires much effort and is often ignored, especially in emergency situations. 
• Management of authorization is a complex issue; employees who are with an organization acquire broad privileges over 
time. 
• Even though documented operational procedures exist, it is difficult and requires large efforts to ensure that they are being 
followed, especially in exceptional, unforeseen situations and emergencies. 
• Security incident management allows an organization to learn from them and to improve but often raises negative press 
coverage and might raise attackers' awareness of the organization's vulnerabilities.  
Figure 1 - Optimal level of local information 
security investment OL. Within an organization, 
the optimal level of spending will occur when an 
increase in information security results in an 
equal decrease in costs due to information 
security lapses. After Gordon and Loeb 2002 
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Table 1: Categories of Information Security Management Requirements  
Risk assessment and treatment 
Security policy 
Organization of information security 
Asset management 
Human resources security 
Physical and environmental security 
Communications and operations management 
Access control 
Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance 
Information security incident management 
Business continuity management 
Compliance 
Firm and infrastructure interdependencies 
Looking at existing extended enterprises we find an increasing dependency on technology to manage inter-firm relationships. 
Disruption of technical services will affect most firms, with effects ranging from severe at firms such as hospitals (which 
increasingly are holding patient records in digital form) and oil and gas companies (which are totally dependent on their 
digital process control systems) through disruptive at firms such as design houses, which use email to share designs amongst 
colleagues and to maintain a high level of contact with their customers, to of little or no consequence at what may be large 
numbers of very small suppliers (Dynes 2006b).  
Technology also forms the core of many supply chain optimization efforts that spans from longer-term efforts such as 
forecasting of supply demand down to very short term efforts to optimize the placement of product on shipping pallets, and 
the placement of those pallets on delivery vans. This level of optimization increases productivity at the potential expense of 
flexibility in business operations.  
Figure 2 diagrams an abstract value chain (suppliers, the firm, and its customers) for large manufacturing firms. In this figure, 
an important part of the supply chain relationship is the forecasts that are sent to important, high volume suppliers. These 
forecasts are very accurate for short time scales, and become increasingly inaccurate the further they look into the future. 
There will also be suppliers for which demand is not forecast; these are not shown.  
In this figure, a possible supply chokepoint is denoted by A. Within the firm, there is the ability to internally produce the 
product using technology-dependent business processes; a possible chokepoint for internal production and delivery is denoted 
by C. Finally, there is the ability to ship completed product. In the figure are two classes of customers, large customers that 
order high volumes of products, and will provide forecasts for those demands, and small customers that will order small 
quantities of product at infrequent intervals. Two possible chokepoints in the ability of the firm to satisfy customers are 
denoted by B. Field studies have shown examples of each chokepoint, depending on how technology is used to optimize 
internal and external business processes (Dynes et al. 2005). 
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Figure 2. Schematic of high-volume plant value chain, showing suppliers, the ‘plant’ incorporating 
order processing, production and fulfilment, and distribution functions. Here, all suppliers are 
provided with forecasts of future demand; on the customer side high-volume customers who provide 
forecasting as well as smaller volume, occasional customers are represented. Three locations of 
possible interruption are denoted by A, B and C. 
Figure 2 shows the interdependencies for a rather abstract view of the supply chain. In reality, the interdependencies within 
and across firms are much more complex. A recent study of an oil refinery showed that the greatest risks to the ability of the 
refinery to function came primarily from the utilities that supplied the refinery: water, natural gas, and other utilities. Without 
these the refinery would quickly shut down. In a hospital, each department can be viewed as a separate entity, connected with 
the other departments through an electronic medical record system. An internal failure of the network could have a major 
impact. Individual institutions in the financial industry are extremely interdependent and count on technology to enable all 
their financial transactions. When asked about what would happen if IP-based systems were to fail, one well-known banker 
responded by saying it would be a “snow day for the world”. 
Insight from industries 
In order to gain insight into a little understood and researched field, researchers have repeatedly suggested and successfully 
applied qualitative research methods such as case studies or expert peer groups (Benbasat and Zmud 1999; Myers 2002). In 
the following sections, a summary of challenges from three critical infrastructures are given. 
Critical infrastructure and industrial process automation 
The need for more research in the field of IT security for industrial control systems becomes ever more evident given the 
background of recent threats, including terrorist attacks. Recent findings show that the threat is reality rather than fiction 
(Amin 2002; Shea 2003). Further, as a result of introducing standard technologies including MS Windows and integration 
strategies for maintenance or control purposes, DCS and SCADA systems have become connected the corporate network; 
they are now as vulnerable to cyber attacks as the rest of the corporate network is (Dzung et al. 2005; Falco et al. 2004; Igure 
et al. 2006; Naedele 2005). 
One example is oil and gas production on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). Here, two reasons speak for organizing the 
operations in an extended enterprise. First, oil and gas production companies traditionally have been operating their plants in 
segregated networks. Their staff typically has a strong mechanical or electrical engineering background and not much 
experience with regard to information security. Upcoming regulations and standards on information security (e.g. NERC CIP, 
ISA SP99) require such expertise; vendors of PCS typically have this expertise and can provide information security 
management as a service. Second, rising economic pressure forces the Norwegian oil and gas industry to increase efficiency 
of operations by leveraging technology enabled efficiency gains. To achieve this goal, the Norwegian Oil Industry 
Association (OLF) has developed the concept of integrated operations (OLF 2006). Since it is not economical for every 
operator to establish connectivity between on- and off-shore sites (e.g., remote control rooms and oil rigs) individually, the 
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Secure Oil Information Link (SOIL) has been put into place as a common network infrastructure. This off-shore system may 
be exposed to cyber security threats from the internet or enterprise networks of SOIL members if not proper information 
security management is in place. Automation system vendors have begun to use this infrastructure to offer their customers a 
wide range of remote monitoring and standard-compliant operations services.  
However, some challenges similar to those mentioned in section 2 remain to be resolved: 
• Management of authorization becomes a more complex issue the more organizations are involved. Even with remote 
monitoring and operations services, operator 's employees off-shore will still have to be able to access the system, e.g. to be 
able to act in emergency situations or in case of a failure in the connectivity to on-shore resources. This is hard when 
organizational boundaries have to be crossed. 
• Authentication management becomes more complex when multiple organizations are involved, particularly when using 
stronger authentication methods such as public key infrastructures.  
• Security incident management. 
• Standards typically require information in transit to be encrypted, usually along the entire transit path. However, industry 
standards typically require operators of critical infrastructures to maintain a log of who performed which actions on the 
system, introducing additional monitoring steps whenever a connection crosses an organizational boundary. 
• Maintaining an accurate inventory of assets must be part of the service offering if the goal is to provide standard compliant 
operations; this is important due to strict change management procedures.  
• Different solutions for similar tasks exist which are incompatible with each other (e.g. for interactive user sessions 
solutions based on Citrix' ICA protocol or Microsoft’s RDP can be chosen), forcing a vendor tot either require its 
customers to use one particular choice or the vendor must support virtually every choice his customer may require. 
Manufacturing 
We now turn to results from field studies that we have been conducting with manufacturing organizations. The basic form of 
these field studies was to identify a ‘host’ organization; we would travel to that host and conduct interviews around these 
issues. We would then ask the host organization to introduce us to a few of their key suppliers, we would then travel to these 
suppliers and conduct similar interviews. We present results from an electrical components organization and an automobile 
parts organization. The electrical organization served a combination of both high and low volume customers. The automotive 
organization was a tier 1 supplier to the automobile industry, meaning that its products went directly in to the finished 
product, rather than a sub-assembly. At the time of the field studies these organizations managed a substantial percentage of 
their supply chain using electronic communications (either EDI or a web portal); both were both involved in efforts to move 
all their supply chain communications to the internet. If successful, these organizations would be completely dependent on 
the internet for their normal supply chain management. 
The host’s suppliers were much more variable with respect to their dependency on the Internet. Most communicated with 
their suppliers using phone and fax, and were much less susceptible to interruptions of their supply chain due to Internet 
outages (Dynes et al. 2005). These tier-two suppliers were also less dependent on the Internet for communication with their 
customers as well. For these suppliers the major impact of an Internet event would not be supply chain or production 
disruptions, but in customer service via email. 
Given this level of interdependency, what would be the impact of an internet outage on the ability to produce and deliver 
product? Consider the electrical parts manufacturer, which produced electrical products that range from small, very high 
volume items such as fuses and switches to large, very low volume items such as power-station transformers. Because of the 
long lead time required for parts that make up these large items, they must be ordered days or weeks in advance. An internet 
disruption the day an order needed to be placed would mean that the order would have to be placed by phone or fax. Since 
these were low-volume items, phone or fax ordering is entirely feasible.  
The high-volume goods that this manufacturer also produces require frequent electronic communication of stock on hand and 
forecasting of demand with suppliers. A forecast to a supplier would typically reiterate this week’s order and progressively 
ill-defined estimates of orders up to ten weeks out. This forecasting and the history between the suppliers and the 
manufacturer result in what one interviewee termed a “supply chain learned behavior”. If the Internet were to fail, the 
suppliers would still deliver the needed supplies without any prompting from the manufacturer due to this ‘learned behavior’.  
The major impact of an Internet outage on the high-volume plants would likely be not a supply-chain issue, but an order 
fulfillment issue (Croxton 2002). Large customers would likely have forecasting and a ‘learned supply chain behavior’ in 
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place and shipments would be packed and shipped as expected. At the opposite end of the spectrum would be hundreds of 
smaller customers without forecasting; it is unlikely that the hundreds of faxes and/or phone calls for one or many products in 
various volumes could be handled Production and packaging would continue, but except for large customers these packages 
would accumulate on the shipping dock as the fulfillment system failed for smaller, ad-hoc orders.  
This is shown graphically in Figure 2 by the point B, indicating the inability of the plant’s order processing and fulfillment 
functions to cope with the volume of orders that would have been placed via the web, but are being phoned and faxed in due 
to the disruption of the Internet. 
The automobile parts manufacturer adopted a different approach to supply chain management than the electrical parts 
manufacturer, which adopted a more just-in-time approach to supply chain management. While the auto parts manufacturer 
shares forecasting information with local suppliers of sub-assemblies, the manufacturer ran its own fleet of trucks to pick up 
these sub-assemblies. To increase efficiency the manufacturer was explicit about how items should be packed, and when they 
should be ready for pick-up. These suppliers would not prepare items for pickup or delivery unless they were explicitly told 
to do so by the manufacturer.  
One outcome of this strategy was the lack of a ‘learned supply-chain behavior’: without communication supplies would not 
be delivered. From our analysis of the number of suppliers, the part counts and the frequency of ordering it is doubtful that 
these communications could be replicated via fax. As a result, there would be a restocking shortfall during an Internet outage.  
On the customer side, the organization had a few very large customers that forecasted their demand; shipments to these 
customers would likely be limited by production rather than managing order communication. In the case of the auto parts 
manufacturer, the bottleneck would not be in the order processing and fulfillment functions, but at the point in Figure 2 
labeled by A: the ability of the supply chain to effectively respond to stock shortages due to the supply chain timing and 
packing optimizations utilized. 
Financial services 
The financial services industry is in the middle of a structural change (Lehmann 2000). Increasing competition and customer 
demands require that financial services companies focus on core competencies in order to deliver better value to their 
customers. Consequently, companies that were formerly highly integrated have split into divisions or independent companies 
focusing on different parts of the value chain (Heinrich and Leist 2002). On the other hand, many customers demand a 
complete range of financial products in order to satisfy their financial needs “one-stop”. This forces financial services 
companies to collaborate with providers of complementary products and services. Ultimately, networks of financial services 
companies (“financial services networks”) emerge (Alt and Reitbauer 2005). 
Privacy constraints are a major issue in almost all the financial service networks examined (Geib et al. 2006). The privacy 
protection laws in Europe are much stricter than in the U.S., making it more difficult for network partners to exchange 
customer data. Customer data is essentially bound to the company that collects it, and can only be used for the stated 
purposes. Special privacy laws prevent banks from sharing any customer data without a court order – even with their 
customers’ permission. Consequently, partners may share data with banks, but banks cannot share data with partners. 
Some product providers cooperate with several small and medium banks that act as relationship managers. They acquired 
their customers’ consent to share personal data with the banks through their general terms and conditions, with only a few 
customers refusing to provide this consent. Due to privacy protection laws in Europe, only relationship managers are allowed 
to have access to all the personal customer information available in the network as they need it for comprehensive customer 
consulting (Fromholz 2000). These data are, of course, interesting for product providers as well for analytical customer 
relationship management, or to improve product innovation based on knowledge about customers. A solution to the privacy 
problem may be for relationship managers to make customer data anonymous before giving it to product providers. The latter 
can then analyze the anonymous data and build models to improve the product innovation and customer scoring of their 
products. 
Figure 3 summarizes the findings from the analysis of financial services networks (Geib et al. 2006): 
 




• Agree on clear responsibilities
Privacy
• Customer consent in general terms
and conditions
• Anonymous data transfer to product
providers
Data Integration
• Joint data model
• Federated (party centralized) data storage
• Unique customer ID or matching algorithm
Process Integration
• Reduce manual tasks, format
conversions, and processing times
• Agree on standard processes
• Agree on integration architecture
Systems Integration
• Consider open source software
and standards
• Internet-based standards
• Web services standards
Figure 3: Requirements for business networking in financial services including customer data security issues 
Building blocks and research issues for information security in the extended enterprise 
Putting a box around managing the risk associated with increasing dependency on the information infrastructure is 
challenging. At a minimum, a risk framework would include the economic impacts of various cyber incidents in the extended 
enterprise, the resiliency of those extended enterprises, the incentives that are present for individual firms to manage these 
risks, and a definition of what constitutes an acceptable level of cyber risk from firm, sector and greater public good 
perspectives. 
As the related research and the observations from different vertical industries show information security in the extended 
enterprise needs to be assessed on at least four levels: 
• Strategy: It is clear from the above that information security is becoming a key enabler of corporate strategy. 
Information security risk should be viewed in this context, along with the risk referred from all the partners and 
suppliers in the extended enterprise. Information security strategy thus becomes a shared property of collaborative 
business entities, with common objectives and basic standards across all partners. 
Core research questions include:  
a. Conceptually, what is an appropriate level of information security for a particular business network: what 
level is the goal (“good enough”)? If firms are adopting levels of information security perceived adequate 
for their local good, what more needs to be done to provide a level adequate for their extended enterprise? 
Their business sector? The greater public good? This is a key question that would integrate and provide 
focus to many ongoing efforts. 
b. How do business entities arrive at a consensus regarding their joint risk posture? In order to avoid free rider 
and negative externality issues, strategies must be developed to assure that in any agreement all entities 
benefit and are responsible. 
c. At individual entities, how is a business case for risk taking and mitigation developed?  
 
• Processes: Processes must be aligned across partners and also assessed for business and security vulnerabilities. It 
becomes clear that processes as operational links between strategy and systems have a crucial function in translating 
strategic imperatives into systemic action. 
Core research questions include: 
a. How are inter-organizational business risk management process defined? Different entities will have 
different risk appetites, and prioritize risks differently; how can a shared vision be achieved? 
b. Who is responsible and accountable for what? While it may be assumed that each partner will manage their 
part of the effort, process transparency will likely benefit all parties. 
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c. Are inter-organizational processes at each entity really equivalent? 
d. How can measurement and reporting be implemented? 
 
• Systems: Once a common security strategy is in place and processes for active risk management across companies’ 
borders are agreed on, the actual implementation of the business and risk processes will require systems level 
support. At this level, intra-firm interfacing and integration issues are obstacles to achieving the information security 
objectives the extended enterprise. 
Core research questions include:  
a. Are access rights and roles technically feasible across partners? 
b. Is it possible to audit systems to assure conformance with standards and regulatory requirements? 
c. What is an acceptable way for partners to assure the systems actually reflect strategy and process 
requirements? 
 
• Culture: Risk needs to be identified and managed at ‘design’ time, not bolted on later as is often the case today. To 
make this change and meet the challenges laid out above requires a substantial cultural change, not only in the way 
individual entities think of internal information risk, but in the types of trust relationships entities have with each 
other.  
Core research questions include: 
a. Are business entities willing to share the level of information required for a successful effort? While 
entities may partner in certain contexts, they could be direct competitors in other contexts. How can entities 
efficiently compartmentalize information regarding processes and intellectual property 
b. Are the security cultures harmonized, e.g. when working with outsourcing partners abroad that may trade 
security quality for lower costs?  
 
• Incentives: Even the best processes and systems that would allow firms to effectively assess and manage the 
information security risks they face in the extended enterprise will be useless unless they are adopted and utilized by 
firms. It follows that an essential building block is providing motivation for firms to adopt and put into practice the 
results of the preceding building blocks.  
Core research questions include: 
a. What motivates firms to adopt certain levels of information security? While there are studies that have 
detailed security investment practices in certain firms, it is clear that existing efforts are descriptive rather 
than prescriptive. Understanding the range of approaches is necessary for developing best practice 
guidelines that can be reasonably applied by a majority of firms. 
b. What is a proper role for government? Few experts or practitioners feel that government regulation is the 
best alternative as they agree that firms ought to be in the best position to know their risks. Despite this, 
there is a valid concern that firms are not doing enough to protect the critical infrastructures that are 
required by society, and such regulation may be needed to assure that information security risks across 
critical infrastructures are comprehensively managed. 
An invitation to future research 
Not only do the levels and their exemplary questions – as mentioned in the previous section - pose challenges for the business 
world, but by the same token open a field for academic research that spans different disciplines such as management, 
information technology and organizational science. The increased complexity of the networked enterprise – in most cases 
operating in different cultures and regulatory environments – prevents a quick solution and itself raises the need for future 
research. Incentives for meeting some level of information security are a key research area. All firms have incentives to adopt 
a level of information security sufficient for the firm’s local good – to be seen as a credible business partner by customers or 
suppliers, or through regulatory mechanisms. For some sectors, the level of information security needed for the good of a 
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business sector (an aggregate of many extended enterprises) may significantly exceed that needed for the good of the firm. 
Are there sufficient incentives for firms to take the steps needed to meet that higher level of security? Looking at the bigger 
picture, it is an open question as to what level of information security is needed for the greater public good. 
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